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I. Introduction 
 
 Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and mostly unexplained 
gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free or freer trade: women tend to be 
less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than men (e.g. Baker 2005, 2009; Graham and 
Pettinato 2001; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Seligson 1999; Scheve 
and Slaughter 2001).  Because the economic importance of trade is growing worldwide, citizens 
can and often influence macroeconomic policymaking, and women comprise greater than 50% of 
the population in most countries, women’s distinct preferences in this major policy area are an 
important phenomenon to consider. 
While earlier studies have posited multiple explanations for general attitudes toward trade 
policy, no well substantiated account of the gender component of trade attitudes has emerged. 
The few studies focusing specifically on the gender-trade attitudes nexus underscore exposure to 
economic ideas (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004) and consumption decisions (Hall, Kao and Nelson 
1998), while those examining general attitudes toward trade have employed not only these two 
approaches (e.g. Baker 2009; Hainmuller and Hiscox 2006), but have also emphasized more 
traditional mobile factors (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and specific factors (Mayda and Rodrik 
2005) approaches, in addition to considering education as human capital (Gabel 1998) and 
sociotropic concerns (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).   
  While this research seeks to address all of the above approaches in order to explain 
gender differences in trade attitudes, it emphasizes the concept of labor mobility as the most 
useful theoretical starting point.    We posit that it is not women in general who tend to be 
negative toward trade but particularly women in the less abundant labor factor – higher or lower-
skilled depending on the country context – who have heightened concerns about open trade’s 
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negative effects on them.  In particular, these individuals tend to be more concerned about the 
potentially disruptive economic effects that such policies might have on them or their families.   
One of the central obstacles to testing theoretical propositions related to explaining trade 
policy attitudes has been the limitations of the available data.  Most public opinion surveys ask 
respondents to provide only a general opinion about free trade and researchers  are left to 
conjecture as to which particular aspect(s) of trade policy and/or its effects the respondent is 
reacting.1  Trade is complex and few surveys bother to ask questions about its meaningful 
components, a shortcoming that poses serious problems for direct testing of many key 
hypotheses.  Trade, and more importantly, changes in trade policy, can have a number of major 
implications for individuals and societies, and respondents are likely to be more concerned about 
the particular aspects that most affect them or their household, including, for example, trade’s 
effects on consumption, jobs (theirs and/or employment more broadly) and economic growth.  
These specific concerns are the components shaping the “general” attitudes on which most 
researchers focus.  Specific to this inquiry, the existing literature suggests that there may be a 
gendered component to many of these aspects, including those related to economic security and 
consumption.   
 Ideally, in order to determine more effectively why women are generally less receptive to 
trade liberalization, survey questions need to ask directly about the specific aspects and/or effects 
                                                 
1  The following surveys include general questions about attitudes toward trade or trade policy: the  American 
National Election Study or NES 1992 (Blonigen 2009; Scheve and Slaughter 2001); Globescan International Survey 
2003 (Baker 2009); International Social Survey Program or ISSP 1995 (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott 2001); Knowledge Networks 2007 (Mansfield and Mutz 2009); Latinobarometro 1996 (Beaulieu, Yatawara 
and Wang 2005), 1997 (Baker 2009); the National Annenberg Election Study 2004 (Mansfield and Mutz 2009); Pew 
Global Attitudes Project 2002, 2007 (Baker 2009); Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences or TESS 2003 
(Burgoon and Hiscox 2004); the Wall Street Journal Americas 1998 (Baker 2009); the World Values Survey 1990-
92, 1995-97, 1999-2001 (Baker 2005, 2009; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny and Ceccoli 2004 use 1995-97 only). Baker 
(2009, Chapter 8) utilizes some questions from his 4-City Survey (Brazil – 2005) about particular aspects of trade 
but uses them to create an index and explore a different theoretical inquiry. 
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of trade policy that might be affecting women differently.  Such data are even better if they are 
collected across space and time.  Researchers can then employ these more nuanced responses as 
dependent variables in order to test competing or complementary theoretical propositions more 
meaningfully. Exploring gender differences in individuals’ wide-ranging concerns about trade’s 
effects on different facets of economic security helps to ensure that the findings are robust.  The 
breadth of question also can help to disentangle the effects of major causal and/or other 
important variables that are otherwise lumped together in the general questions.   
Several recent major public opinion surveys across three disparate countries or sets of countries – 
the U.S., six major Latin American countries and five countries with predominant or large 
Muslim populations – offer excellent opportunities to explore some of these complexities 
because they probe deeply and widely into individuals’ perceptions of and attitudes toward trade 
and its effects. Survey themes include economic security concerns – e.g. jobs, overall economic 
growth, markets for exports, pocketbook economic concerns, etc – and consumption, while also 
collecting other crucial individual-level data such as educational attainment. A multi-country and 
region research design serves to identify any divergence in gender’s effects on trade attitudes 
between developed and developing countries, thereby helping to test a mobile factors theory 
more effectively. 
The empirical findings of this research suggest that a mobile factors approach is a useful 
theoretical starting point in an explanation of gender differences in trade attitudes across a wide 
sample of countries.  In the U.S., less educated women are more likely to have negative attitudes 
toward international trade and many things that it affects including consumption, workers and 
business.  On the other hand, women with higher levels of formal education in the U.S. are more 
likely to report that trade has positive effects on the country’s workers and consumption.  In 
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contrast, in developing countries, it is educated women who are more likely to view aspects of 
trade more negatively, including its effects on jobs, markets and consumption in Latin America, 
and trade overall and domestic business in the Muslim-country survey, while less educated 
women in the Muslim-country survey view trade’s effects on domestic business positively.  As 
we develop below, women who are more likely to feel economically less secure because they are 
part of the scarce factor are more skeptical toward freer trade and its many facets, which include 
women with less education in developed economies and with more education in many emerging 
economies.  In many of these developing countries, educated women are relatively new to their 
more skilled jobs in the labor marketplace and in times of major economic change – such as 
changes caused and/or exacerbated by trade policy reform – they may feel more vulnerable to the 
disruptions that often occur.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the literature and develops the 
theoretical framework. Data and the methodology are given in Section III; while Section IV 
presents the empirical results. Alternative explanations are discussed in Section V. The paper 
ends with concluding remarks in Section VI. 
 
II. Literature and Theoretical Framework 
The existing literature on trade policy attitudes has established empirically that a number 
of theoretical approaches offer explanatory utility.  Recognizing this utility and because there are 
no compelling reasons that these explanations need to be theoretically or empirically exclusive of 
each other, we employ a framework that seeks to integrate them.  However, because the literature 
on trade attitudes has grown somewhat vast, we will focus in this section on the approaches that 
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have been most directly associated with gender and/or are most germane to our broader 
argument, including economic security, consumption, education/knowledge and risk. 
 
II.a A Mobile Factors Approach and Economic Security 
A major component of economic security is personal labor mobility.  In a mobile factors 
approach to explaining trade attitudes, individuals in the abundant labor factor – higher-skilled in 
developed countries and lower-skilled in developing countries – are more likely to prefer policies 
of freer trade because they are theoretically better positioned to thrive in a more liberalized 
economy.2  Researchers argue that the goods or services generated by the abundant labor factor 
are comparatively more competitive in the global marketplace, which garners those workers 
higher wages.  The corollary suggests that individuals in the scarce factor – lower-skilled in 
developed countries and higher-skilled in developing countries – will be more wary of 
liberalized trade because their industry will not do as well thereby mitigating demand for their 
skills and driving down their wages.3 
We suggest that the scarce-factor dynamic is particularly heightened for women because 
they potentially face even greater economic and workforce constraints than men and stand 
potentially to lose more from policies that may cause economic distortion or dislocation.  Many 
researchers have noted and some have demonstrated empirically that women often bear a 
disproportionate economic burden after liberalization (e.g. SIPA 2001, Tickner 2001).  
Therefore, women in the scarce labor factor face a veritable double burden: both their gender and 
their skill set appear to limit their economic opportunities.  It is reasonable therefore to expect 
                                                 
2 In an analysis of the relationship between trade policy and inequality, Dutt and Mitra (2002) also employ a 
framework consistent with a mobile factors approach.  Though gender and inequality are of course distinct concepts, 
the multi-purpose nature of the general framework illustrates its broad utility.  
3 For in-depth general discussions of these approaches, see Baker 2009; and Mansfield and Mutz 2009. 
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that these women will tend to be more skeptical of economic policy changes that present greater 
potential danger to their more precarious economic status, including trade liberalization.   
Accordingly, we should be able to observe clear evidence of predictable differences 
among more and less educated women in both developed and less developed economies.  In 
developed economies, women with more formal education, by virtue of being the abundant labor 
factor, should enjoy greater labor market flexibility and opportunity and be more positive toward 
different facets of trade.  Also, in developed economies such as the U.S., less educated women 
are generally more economically vulnerable and should demonstrate wide-ranging and deeper 
concerns about liberalizing trade.  Kucera and Milberg (2000) demonstrate empirically that in the 
higher-skilled Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, trade 
with countries with abundant lower-skilled labor has had a disproportionate negative effect on 
lower-skilled female workers in these more developed economies.   
In developing countries, higher-skilled skilled workers are not only the scarce labor 
factor, but higher-skilled women in particular in many circumstances are newer to and a minority 
in the workforce, and are frequently the first to feel negative effects as labor demands change.  
Empirically, the ILO (2010) finds precisely this negative dynamic across a wide range of 
developing countries and regions: educated women are consistently facing lower wages, losing 
their jobs and not finding work disproportionate to educated men.4  Thus, policies such as free 
trade that can generate significant economic change are more likely to be viewed with skepticism 
and even negativity by these women.  Finally, theory also suggests that less educated women in 
developing countries will be more likely to endorse freer trade.  Recent empirical studies 
demonstrate that in the post-liberalization environment, wage gains for women have accrued 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that mobile factors approaches assume full employment, which in strict terms, limits the 
theory to anticipating only wage decreases.   
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disproportionately to the lower-skilled (Kabeer 2000; Mathew 2006; Saavedra 2001).  Therefore, 
it is reasonable to expect that they might look at trade more positively than their better educated 
compatriots.  However, this expectation should also be tempered with the complex economic 
reality that while lower-skilled women might be doing better than before economic opening, 
many studies show that trade liberalization generates winners and losers as labor is reallocated 
according to factor endowments and some groups of low-skilled women have also fared poorly 
(see Artecona and Cunningham 2002).5   
Another component of the mobile factors approach is individuals’ direct economic 
pocketbook concerns (e.g. Kaltenthaler et al 2004; Seligson 1999), because these concerns are 
closely associated with wages and consumption, and thus economic security of the individual 
and their household. Though studies have found only occasional evidence that these concerns 
drive individual-level attitudes toward trade, women may feel these microeconomic pressures 
more acutely than men.  In recent decades, women have been taking an increasingly direct 
household management role in both developed and developing countries and pocketbook 
concerns may now be more important to many women because of these significant role changes 
(see Varley 1996).  
Changes in trade policy might affect individual-level consumption and thus their broader 
economic situation.  Recent research (see especially Baker 2003, 2009) argues that perceptions 
of improved consumption opportunities as a result of more open trade help to drive more positive 
                                                 
5 A competing theoretical view posits a specific factors approach wherein the individual’s industry strongly 
influences trade policy preferences. In brief, individuals in export-oriented sectors are more likely to support open 
trade while those in import-competing sectors prefer more closed trade policies (see Mayda and Rodrik 2005). In a 
recent working paper, Beaulieu and Napier (2008) test a specific factors hypothesis and a related tradables versus 
non-tradables hypothesis, and find that neither sectoral differences in employment nor employment in a tradable 
versus a non-tradable sector helps to explain gender differences in attitudes toward trade. They do find that the 
gender gap is more pronounced in developed economies than in developing ones, but do not offer an explanation.  
They conclude in part that the lack of a clear explanation of the gender gap in attitudes may be due to immeasurable 
differences between the attributes of males and females. 
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attitudes toward liberalized trade.   It is reasonable to expect that women – generally highly 
active in household-level purchasing – will strongly consider policies that potentially affect 
consumption.  A recent survey of 12,000 women in 21 countries estimates that women are 
responsible for nearly two-thirds of purchasing worldwide (BCG 2008).  With an increasing 
number of women heading households, perhaps especially so in developing nations, this 
proportion of purchasing will likely continue to increase.6  Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
anticipate that women’s perceptions of the effects of trade policy on consumption – including the 
price, quality and variety of consumer goods – may directly affect their policy attitudes.   
Hall, Kao and Nelson (1998) examine the historical relationship between female political 
influence and trade policy utilizing a logic that suggests that women have more of a 
consumption-based perception of trade policy and are going to be more in favor of liberalized 
trade because tariffs increase prices. Comparing U.S. tariff levels before and after women’s 
enfranchisement, they find a gender gap wherein policy became more open – at least in terms of 
tariff levels – after this systemic change in voter eligibility, though they note the large number of 
possible conflicting or complementary explanations.  In essence, the researchers are suggesting 
that women are more likely to condition their votes on changes in prices, while men tend to 
emphasize wages.  The research, however, does not explicitly consider the interaction of gender 
and education. 
Women’s central interest in consumption presents at least two related theoretical 
possibilities.  First, because women across education and income groups are generally active in 
household purchasing, the perceived consumptive benefits from trade might cause all women to 
look more favorably on this aspect of open trade (or even tilt general attitudes of women more 
                                                 
6 Varley (1996) argues that women-led households are in fact dramatically undercounted because the convention has 
been to count only single-female-parent with dependents as “woman-led.”   
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positively toward open and/or international trade).  Or second, women with more limited means 
– indicated best by lower levels of education and/or income – will be particularly attracted to the 
notion of getting more for their money (e.g. Booth et al 1993).  Thus, women with lower levels 
of education and/or income will be more supportive of open trade because of its positive effects 
on consumption.  Since all three surveys query respondents directly about how they think trade 
and/or trade policy is affecting their consumption, it is possible to examine this relationship 
directly. 
 
II.b Sociotropic 
Somewhat outside of the mobile factors framework, some scholars suggest that 
perceptions of the macroeconomic or “sociotropic” environment, including overall economic 
growth and/or broader employment opportunities in the general economy, have an effect on 
attitudes toward trade.  For example, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that in the U.S., regardless 
of gender, respondents’ sociotropic concerns have a resounding impact on their attitudes toward 
trade: people who view the economy positively are more supportive of open trade.  In developing 
countries, where there is ample evidence that trade can disproportionately affect vulnerable 
segments of the population under certain circumstances, it is reasonable to expect individuals to 
demonstrate concern about trade’s macroeconomic effects.  But the theoretical expectations are 
complex and not well developed. For example, it is challenging to disentangle individuals’ 
perceptions of their pocketbook concerns from sociotropic ones because it is not clear that people 
can make these distinctions clearly.  Is it reasonable to expect that an individual would support 
free trade if it is working well for the broader economy but not for them individually?  Finally, 
there are no clear expectations for specific gender implications.   
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II.c Ideas and Education 
Scholars have also focused on exposure to ideas and information about the economic 
principles of trade, as well as on education more generally, in order to explain trade attitudes.  
Hiscox and Hainmueller (2006) argue that the actual ideas that people learn are important in 
terms of shaping their attitudes toward trade.  They posit that the fairly consistent positive 
relationship between education and support for free trade in developed countries that scholars 
have found is more a function of educated people’s exposure to specific economic ideas.  
Burgoon and Hiscox’s (2004) version of this basic argument includes a gender twist by 
suggesting that the gap between men and women is mainly a difference in their exposure to 
economic ideas.  The authors argue that men are more likely to be exposed to ideas that support 
freer trade such as comparative advantage – for example, by being more likely to take a college 
economics class – and therefore will be more likely to prefer policies that correspond to these 
ideas.  They test their hypothesis using data from the U.S. and find that incorporating knowledge 
of trade issues (or suitable proxies) considerably closes the gender gap even after controlling for 
alternative explanations including those more focused on mobility and consumption. 
The logic of the “ideas” hypothesis is extremely challenging to test because it is 
necessary to know the actual ideas to which individuals have been exposed.  One crude 
possibility is that college-educated women have generally been exposed to more economic ideas 
than women without a college education because of the relative sophistication of the subject 
material compared to other educational experiences (e.g. high school or vocational institutions), 
and they will therefore be more positive toward trade.  Some important shortcomings of this 
claim are discussed in greater detail below. 
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 The human capital explanation interprets the role of education differently than the “ideas” 
approach.  Scholars (e.g. Gabel 1998) who privilege the importance of human capital argue that 
no matter the context, people with more education are better poised to be more mobile in the 
labor market and will be more supportive of general social welfare-maximizing policies such as 
liberalized trade.  Thus, regardless of their status in terms of factor abundance and/or the 
economic ideas to which they have been exposed, more educated people – including women – 
should be more supportive of liberalizing trade. 
 In the cases of both the ideas and human capital, a clear pattern should emerge across the 
data and corresponding analyses below.  If either or both are helping to explain some of the 
variation – and we will not be able to discern which with these data – we should observe 
consistently that better educated women support open trade. 
 
II.d Risk Preferences 
 A strand of the economics literature examining why men and women often make 
different economic decisions privileges the role of risk.  In particular, studies cite the possible 
gender effects of emotions; overconfidence; and interpretations of risk as threat or a challenge 
(see Crosson and Gneezy 2009 for a review), and some have argued that women tend to be more 
emotional and less “overconfident” than men, and more likely to interpret risk as a threat.  
Because economic liberalization by nature entails some, if not significant, risk, this logic could 
be used as a theoretical starting point to understand preferences toward changes in trade policy. 
 While we cannot test these propositions directly – in fact, most of this literature is based 
on controlled laboratory experiments – we can predict the general results that we should observe 
if this logic is suitable to helping to explain trade preferences.  If women by “nature” are simply 
12 
 
more emotional, less overconfident and see risk as a threat, there should be systematic evidence 
of women, ceteris paribus, being more likely to reject the riskiness of a potentially changed 
economic context – i.e. liberalized trade – no matter their status in terms of factor endowments.  
To further complicate this proposition, however, some researchers (e.g. Atkinson et al 2003) 
have found that education and knowledge can attenuate gender differences in economic 
decisions.  If this is the case then we should see clear evidence of educated and/or trade-
knowledgeable women more likely to support trade liberalization.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.a Data 
 The data are drawn from three recent public opinion surveys.  The surveys were 
administered in the U.S., the six countries in Latin America with the largest economies 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela); and five countries with 
predominant or large Muslim populations (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey).7  
This collection of surveys provides considerable variation in terms of the average income, the 
type of political system and the structure of the national economies, among other country-level 
variables. 
The U.S. survey is “Fortune Magazine Poll # 2008-4311: Economy,” which was fielded 
in 2008 by Abt – Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, Incorporated (SRBI).  The survey sought to 
examine the attitudes of 1000 randomly-selected individuals toward the U.S. economy and 
related issues in the first year of the worldwide economic crisis. 
                                                 
7 The broader Muslim-country survey also included Great Britain, Iran, and Palestine, but questions about trade were 
excluded entirely for Great Britain and Iran, and basic demographic variables were excluded for Palestine. Where 
possible, we run alternative analyses in order to include Palestine, and consistently; these results are similar to those 
presented in this research.  
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The survey from Latin America was executed in six countries in late 2005 by Zogby 
International and the University of Miami.  The surveyors specifically targeted 500 people that 
the pollsters identified as “leaders” or “opinion-makers” – people with high-level government 
jobs, management positions in private industry, a salaried position in a media company (e.g. 
television, print, radio, etc) or holding some type of elected public office.  In other words, all of 
the respondents were either well educated formally or at least informally through their work 
experience.  While the lack of variation in educational level makes the data less ideal for the 
purposes of this inquiry, the range of questions that permit a variety of relevant dependent 
variables justifies the survey’s inclusion.  Moreover, though the bias in the data generates 
obvious limitations in terms of educational group comparisons, it makes the implicit tests for 
both the ideas and human capital hypotheses even stiffer.  In other words, because most of these 
respondents demonstrate greater than average levels of both education and human capital, we 
should observe continuity in (the positive) responses if the education and/or human capital 
propositions are correct.  Finally, the notion that elites wield considerable policy influence has 
been theoretically well developed (e.g. Zaller 1992) and tested empirically in many contexts, 
including Latin America (e.g. Baker 2009; Bishin, Lebo and Barr 2006).  
 The third survey was administered in countries with predominantly or large Muslim 
populations in early 2008 by www.worldpublicopinion.org, which is a collaborative project 
involving research centers from around the world and managed by the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland.  The original survey sought the opinions 
of a random sample of more than 5,000 individuals in eight countries about globalization and 
related issues including international trade.  Four of the five survey countries are among the top 
ten countries in the world with the largest Muslim populations (all but Azerbaijan). 
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 Note that we are not attempting to integrate the findings from the analyses of the three 
surveys.  We fully recognize that they are not readily comparable in such a direct fashion 
because of the different contexts of survey implementation and the different questions.  
However, we argue that there is inherent value in looking at the broader pattern of findings to 
determine if the effects are broadly consistent with theoretical constructs. 
III.b Dependent variables 
As the survey data permit, we seek to use dependent variables that examine both trade 
policy attitudes generally and individuals’ attitudes toward trade’s major effects, including on 
jobs, mobility, economic pocketbook issues, macroeconomic performance and consumption.  
While the precise questions vary, there is sufficient continuity across the three surveys to 
generate a meaningful discussion comparing the results (see Data Appendix A for the wording of 
each question).  
In the U.S. survey, the dependent variables are direct queries about attitudes on trade 
generally, and its effects on the respondent personally, workers, business and consumption.  The 
respondents have three options: “worse” (coded as -1), “neutral” (0) or “better” (1).  
In the Latin America survey, questions ask about general free trade and specifically about 
freer trade’s effects on jobs, economic growth, demand for a country’s goods, and demand for 
exports. The general question utilizes a four-point ascending scale, where “very bad” is set to 1 
and “very good” is set to 4.  The menu of possible answers for the trade effects questions is a 
five-point, ascending scale (1-5): very negative, negative, neutral, positive and very positive.   
The last dependent variable from the Latin America survey is based on three consumer-
oriented questions.  The survey asks respondents three separate questions about the effects of 
trade on the price, quality and variety of goods – giving the respondent the choice of negative (-
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1), neutral (0) or positive (1).  Using the three responses, we create a simple additive seven-point 
consumer scale variable index (range=-3 to 3).   In separate specifications, we also use the three-
point scale for each component of consumption to determine if there is a gender effect on these 
specific parts of the broader consumer issue (See Appendix B). 
 The questions in the survey of Muslim countries tap into the same conceptual issues as 
the other two surveys, including trade generally and trade’s effects on consumption, job security, 
job creation, standard of living and domestic business.  There is one additional question about 
trade’s effects on the environment that is difficult to place directly in this research’s broader 
theoretical discussion but which we include as a robustness and stability check for the significance 
and direction of the coefficients of the variables included in the other analyses.  The possible answers 
to all of these questions are dichotomous: “good” (1) or “bad” (0). 
 
III.c Independent Variables 
 Considering the theoretical inquiry of this research, the first independent variable is 
gender.  Following most research, it is a dummy variable where “female” is set to 1.  Drawing 
from the general literature on trade attitudes, other key variables include: education; age; income; 
prospective economic outlook; and ideology and/or political party.  Where data permit and there 
is compelling theoretical logic and/or strong precedent in the literature, we include several other 
controls in some analyses.  
The second major independent variable most relevant to this theoretical inquiry, 
education, is a very complex variable in the trade attitudes literature and as discussed above is 
often poorly developed theoretically.  Scholars use it to represent mobility by identifying if an 
individual is part of the abundant factor, the level of individual human capital, and “knowledge” 
about trade and related economic issues.  
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In this research, it is particularly important theoretically to determine how more and less 
educated women react to trade liberalization, and if there are distinct patterns across different 
types of countries.  Accordingly, in order to generate a meaningful interaction of education and 
gender in the U.S. and Muslim-country surveys, we first dichotomize education into college 
graduate and those who are not college graduates.  Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) present 
empirical data supporting the contention that college education – more than any other type of 
education – has a measurable and significant effect on support for free trade.   We then create an 
interaction between the two dummy variables: college graduate and female.  In addition, in 
contrast to using the ordered education variable in the interaction term, generating an interaction 
of gender and the dichotomous education variable permits more meaningful interpretations of the 
constituent terms.  The female constituent term represents women who are not college graduates, 
while the college graduate constituent term represents males with college degrees.  In the Latin 
America dataset, the sample is comprised of elites so there is little variation on the education 
variable as most respondents have a college education while many more hold additional graduate 
or professional degrees.  We do not create an interaction variable initially but do include an 
education variable in order to examine the effects of higher education more generally as the data 
permit. In the Latin America survey, education is a six-point scale where 1 represents no high 
school, 2 is some high school, 3 is a high school graduate, 4 is some college, 5 is college 
graduate, and 6 is a graduate or professional degree.   
Age is generally linked by scholars to mobility.  People who are older are thought to be 
less able or perhaps less willing to relocate, so policies such as liberalizing trade that can have 
implications for dislocating workers are often less popular with them.  In each dataset, age is a 
continuous measure by year.   
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Like education, income is also often poorly developed theoretically.  High incomes can 
indicate some level of mobility. High incomes can also indicate more consumptive power.  
Income is also usually highly correlated (and/or causally related) to education, so it is not easy to 
disentangle these complexities.  In any event, it is positively related to attitudes toward open 
trade and statistically significant in most research.  In terms of measurement across the surveys, 
though the actual increments are different, the measures are conceptually similar.  The U.S. 
survey uses a seven-point scale: 1 represents respondents reporting income less than $20,000; 
2=$20,000 to just under $35,000; 3=$35,000 to just under $50,000; 4=$50,000 to just under 
$75,000; 5=$75,000 to just under $100,000; 6=$100,000 to just under $150,000; and 7=$150,000 
or more.  In the Latin American survey, income is a five-point scale where 1 is respondents 
reporting annual income less than $15,000 (USD); a 2 represents $15-30,000; 3=$30-45,000; 
4=$45-60,000; and 5=greater than $60,000.  In the Muslim-country survey, using specific scales 
for each country relative to cost of living, the surveyors use a three-point income scale of low, 
medium and high, which we code from 1 to 3 respectively. 
Studies have found a consistent positive relationship between broader macroeconomic 
outlook and attitudes toward open trade (see particularly Mansfield and Mutz 2009).  Though 
theoretically it is challenging to disentangle this notion from mobility and/or economic security 
distinctly (and from several of the dependent variables, too), it appears likely that many citizens 
consider the broader economy and link those perceptions to the policies that may be affecting it, 
including trade policy. In the U.S. and Latin America surveys, there are questions about 
prospective economic outlook.  In the U.S. survey, the question is a short-term prospective one 
where the survey asks if the economy is “getting better” (coded 1), staying the same (0), or 
getting worse (-1).”  In the Latin America survey, the question asks: Within the next two years, 
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do you expect the economy in your country to… decline greatly (coded as 1), decline somewhat 
(2), improve somewhat (3), or improve greatly (4).  There are no sociotropic questions asked in 
the Muslim-country data, nor any questions that could serve as a reasonable proxy. 
Though it has been much less consistently demonstrated in the empirical research, some 
scholars posit that attitudes toward trade policy are shaped by more of a personal economic 
interest or “pocketbook” concerns (e.g. Kaltenthaler et al 2004).  Only the U.S. survey asks a 
pocketbook economic question: Just thinking about your own personal economic situation, do 
you feel that over the past twelve months things have gotten better (coded as 1), worse (-1), or 
stayed about the same (0)? 
 Some researchers have posited a strong link between ideology and attitudes toward trade.  
But once again, the theoretical logic is far from clear.  On one hand, from the viewpoint of a 
mobile factors approach, political parties that are supported largely by the abundant labor factor 
should have supporters that are in favor of more open trade.  In developed countries, these parties 
should be right-leaning and supported by capital and higher-skilled citizens, and in developing 
countries, these parties should be left-leaning and supported by lower-skilled labor.  While this 
dynamic seems to hold well in developed countries, scholars have found more support for 
openness in some developing countries from right-leaning parties (e.g. Magaloni and Romero 
2008) or a near convergence in support for more open policies between the left and right (e.g. 
Armijo and Faucher 2002; Kingstone and Young 2009).  The U.S. and Latin America surveys 
offer data on political party affiliation and ideology.  For the U.S. data, we code the political 
party variable on a five-point scale with strong Democrat coded to 1, a leans-Democrat coded as 
2, an independent that reports no leaning to either party as 3, a leans-Republican as 4 and a 
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strong Republican coded as 5.8  In the Latin America data, we use a simple dichotomous measure 
if the respondent indicates that they self-identify as supporting a left-leaning political party.   
In Latin America particularly, some research has emphasized the strong support from the 
business sector for policies of trade openness in the post-reform era (e.g. Armijo and Faucher 
2002).  Considering that business tends to lean right ideologically, this hypothesis is in some 
tension with a narrow interpretation of the mobile-factors approach and its predictions for how 
the less abundant factor should be negatively-oriented toward open trade.  To include this 
dynamic in the analysis of the Latin America survey, we generate a dummy variable for those 
respondents who self-identify as working in the business sector. 
 In order to examine preliminarily the trade knowledge hypothesis (see Burgoon and 
Hiscox 2004) using the U.S. survey data, we include a measure of self-identified trade 
knowledge.  Of course, whether the respondent is qualified to assess their own actual 
knowledge of trade is a separate but important issue; in effect, in many cases, it is more 
likely a measure of issue salience than actual knowledge.  In either event, we argue that it is 
a useful control.  The question asks: On another topic, compared to most other issues in the 
news, how closely do you follow news about United States trade with foreign countries – 
very closely (3), somewhat closely (2), not very closely (1), or not at all (0)?  
 
III.d Methodology 
 The nature of the ordered responses in the U.S. (three-point) and Latin American datasets 
(four- and five-point) suggests the use of ordered probit.  For the Muslim country dataset, 
because the questions ask only if the respondents think that trade is good or bad in relation to 
                                                 
8 A separate question in the survey asks respondents if they self-identify as liberals or conservatives.  We use this 
measure as an alternative, and it produces substantively similar results to the political party variable. 
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specific issues, we code the answers dichotomously (1 and 0 respectively) and utilize an 
appropriate multivariate method for binary outcomes, probit analysis.9  As a general check on the 
robustness of the results from the analyses using ordered dependent variables, we try 
dichotomizing these ordered dependent variables so that “1” indicates any positive response, and 
re-run the analyses using regular probit analysis.  The results do not change substantively from 
the ordered probit analyses using the more nuanced responses (presented in the tables).10 
 Because country-level traits might affect the results, we include country dummies.  It is 
likely that specific characteristics of certain countries affect the results, but without more 
countries to establish a sample at this higher level of analysis, it is not possible to control 
meaningfully for these possibilities.  In an ideal scenario, a hierarchical model would be utilized 
(see Baker 2005, 2009), but under the constraints of the data – particularly too few countries in 
each survey – the best alternative is the use of a set of country dummies.  For the Latin America 
surveys, we use Mexico as the baseline country because we expect that its exceptionally close 
trading relationship with the U.S. makes it distinct from its Latin American neighbors.  For the 
Muslim-country survey, we use Nigeria as the baseline because of its huge petroleum-based 
economy, unique among the five countries.  For the sake of simplicity of presentation and 
because the country variables are not directly germane to the theoretical discussion, we do not 
include them in the results in the tables. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We run the ordered-dependent variable models for the U.S. and Latin America using ordered logistic regression 
and these models produce substantively similar results to the ordered probit models in terms of direction, size and 
strength of the coefficients.  Similarly, we run the analyses for the Muslim-country data using logistic regression and 
the results are almost identical. 
10 We also run these analyses using logistic regression and the results are substantively similar. 
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IV. Results and discussion 
 The results from the empirical analyses of the three different surveys reveal convincing 
preliminary evidence supporting a mobile factors/economic security-focused theoretical 
argument to explain gender differences in the perceptions of trade policy, as well as an inherent 
complexity to trade attitudes.  Consistent with the predictions of this research’s theoretical 
framework and Beaulieu and Napier’s (2008) finding, the results demonstrate that there are 
marked differences in how gender affects attitudes toward trade among those respondents from 
the developed country and the developing countries in these analyses.  In brief, in the U.S., the 
interaction between gender and education demonstrates a mostly positive effect on trade 
attitudes: college-educated women tend to see the effects of international trade more positively.  
The even stronger corollary suggests that women without a college education tend to be more 
negative toward open trade in general and many of its effects.  In contrast, in developing 
countries, the results of the multivariate analyses suggest that educated women tend to be more 
negative toward freer trade or international trade more generally and many of its effects. 
Overall, these results for gender undoubtedly have affirming implications for the utility 
of a mobile factors hypothesis.  Note particularly that women in the abundant factor in the 
developed country – i.e. those who are higher-skilled – are more supportive of free trade, while 
educated women in the developing countries, who comprise part of the scarce labor factor, are 
more negative about open or international trade.  These findings essentially support what a 
mobile-factors-based theory would predict.  Moreover, the totality of the evidence – negative 
attitudes toward multiple, wide-ranging aspects of international trade and its effects – suggests 
that the findings are pretty robust.  The results for both the developed and developing countries 
are robust across a number of dependent variables representing general trade and its various 
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major effects, which suggests that women are conceptualizing multiple aspects of trade policies 
and corresponding effects relatively consistently. 
On a related note, a mobile factors approach assumes full employment. While it is 
reasonable to argue that women are concerned about wage levels, it is likely that they also have 
grave direct concerns about their employment status – i.e. job or no job – and concerns well 
beyond the individual level. The results from these analyses clearly bear out women’s broad 
concerns about trade liberalization.  These more comprehensive interpretations, however, are not 
well accounted for theoretically in a strict mobile factors approach, so it seems reasonable to 
consider relaxing this assumption to allow for these concerns. 
 
IV.a U.S. Survey 
The results from the U.S. survey (Table 1) point to a marked divergence between college-
educated and less educated women.  Moreover, these results are robust across most of the 
different dependent variables – the particular focus of the question about trade and/or its effects 
simply does not seem to matter much.  These findings also suggest strongly that the consistent 
negative general finding for gender may be driven in considerable part by women with less 
education in developed countries.  The results demonstrate that the coefficients of the constituent 
female variable – which represents women without a college education – is negative and 
significant not only in the analyses utilizing the consumer and workers dependent variables, but 
also the macro-economy and business dependent variables.  Women without college degrees are 
more likely to have a negative attitude toward most of the major components and/or effects of 
international trade.  In contrast, the coefficients of the interaction between college-educated and 
female are positive and significant in the analyses with the consumer and effects on workers 
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dependent variables.  College-educated women are more likely to report that international trade 
is good for consumption and U.S. workers.   
 
IV.b Latin America Survey   
In the Latin America analyses (Table 2), the results are in significant contrast to the U.S. 
analyses, suggesting that female respondents, all of whom have been identified by the surveyors 
as “elites,” are less likely to believe that more open trade is good for jobs, consumer benefits and 
new markets for their country’s goods.11  In these three analyses, the coefficients of the female 
variable are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  Elite women are more likely to 
believe that trade is not good for creating jobs, which speaks to concerns about their economic 
security.  The results suggest that elite female respondents are also less likely to believe that 
policies of open trade improve consumer conditions.  Where Baker (2003 and 2009) 
hypothesizes that people’s perceptions of the relationship between trade and consumption are 
mainly positive, and Hall et al (1998) suggest that women in particular hold this viewpoint, this 
finding suggests that we should examine the relationship a little more closely from a gender 
perspective (and given the appropriate data – particularly wider variation on the education 
variable – perhaps, a gender and education interactive perspective).  It is possible that women 
and men have different expectations for trade’s positive or negative effects on consumption.  In 
the three analyses that examine several macroeconomic components of trade, the results are 
somewhat mixed.  In the analysis that examines the effects of more open trade on markets for a 
country’s goods, the coefficient of the female variable is negative and significant at the five-
percent level.  In the effects of freer trade on economic growth analysis, the gender coefficient is 
                                                 
11 As stated above, there is little variation on education (more than 90% of respondents are college-educated) so an 
interaction between education and gender in the Latin America analysis is not comparable to the other surveys. 
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positive, and in the demand for exports analysis, the coefficient is negative, but neither 
coefficient is statistically significant.  Finally, in contrast to much of the more general literature 
on attitudes toward open trade, in the analysis that examines general attitudes toward free trade, 
the gender coefficient is actually positive, though not statistically significant.   
 
IV.c Muslim-country Survey 
In the analyses using the Muslim-country survey data (Table 3), two of the results 
suggest a finding similar to the Latin American analyses that more educated women are less 
supportive of open trade, though the results are weaker – significant only at the less demanding 
10% level.  The negative finding is for both the general trade question and the question about 
international trade’s effects on the respondent’s country’s domestic businesses.  Notably, the 
results also suggest that less educated women believe that open trade is good for domestic 
business.12  The implication of this finding is not entirely clear but may have to do with the 
nature of business in which less educated women are more likely to participate in these 
countries: service industries.  If for example, women help to run small retail businesses, it is 
possible that the prospect of more and cheaper imported goods to sell is attractive.  Finally, in the 
other five analyses that examine effects of international trade on consumption, job creation, job 
security, standard of living and environment, neither gender nor the interaction between gender 
and education is significant.  This important finding of little or no effect across most of these 
analyses suggests that there is a less strong gendered component to trade attitudes in these five 
                                                 
12 In an otherwise identical analysis but without the interaction of female and education, the coefficient for gender is 
positive and significant only in the domestic business analysis.  It is important to note that the inclusion of the 
interaction of the college graduate and female variables suggests strongly that less educated and more educated 
women diverge in their perception of trade’s effect on domestic business. Such results raise the possibility that 
gender variables that are not statistically significant in analyses of individual attitudes toward trade policy may be 
instances where two or more groups of women with differing viewpoints are dulling the overall gender effects 
precisely because meaningful interactions are not adequately incorporated. 
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developing countries with large or predominant Muslim populations.  It is possible that women 
are less engaged economically in societies that tend to privilege the roles of males, but more 
research is necessary to explain meaningfully why there are more limited effects of gender, 
especially compared to Latin America and the U.S. 
IV.d Consumption 
The consumption findings suggest a notable contrast between the U.S. and Latin 
America.  The results from the U.S. survey strongly indicate that educated women in the U.S. are 
far more likely to believe that international trade has positive effects on consumption, while less 
educated women are much more likely to be negative.  The first finding may be consistent with 
Hall et al’s (1998) theoretical supposition about perceptions of the link between tariffs and price. 
But, in terms of their attitudes toward trade, at the time of this survey (2008), concerns about 
jobs appear to trump the benefits to consumption for U.S. women with lower levels of education, 
which is quite a reasonable finding in light of the scope and magnitude of the worldwide 
economic crisis.  It is clearly difficult to parse out if individuals are more focused on changes in 
price or wages stemming from globalization, 
The finding that female elites in Latin America do not generally have a positive outlook 
toward trade’s effects on consumption runs counter to the U.S. finding and is an interesting 
addendum to some previous research.  Baker (2003, 2009) finds in a number of rigorous models 
using multiple public opinion surveys that people in Latin America are generally supportive of 
free trade in some part because of its benefits for consumption.  The findings in this research 
suggest that previous positive results may be driven largely by certain discrete groups – e.g. men 
and/or less-educated women.  More research needs to be done in order to identify and explain 
better patterns of attitudes across different types of groups of respondents, and to examine more 
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rigorously what individuals believe is positive or negative about how open trade affects their 
consumption.  Building on the latter goal, we seek to disentangle preliminarily the components 
of consumption by running separate analyses for the three components that comprise the seven-
point consumption index used as the principal dependent variable: price, quality and variety of 
goods. We find statistically significant gender differences on trade’s effects on price and quality 
(both negative), but not on the variety of goods (see Appendix B).13 
IV.e Education and/or Knowledge 
The divergent results between the U.S. and the emerging or developing countries in these 
surveys suggest that scholars need to pay closer attention to issues of education and knowledge.  
While this research finds generally what many other scholars find in terms of educated people in 
the U.S., and perhaps especially educated women, having more positive viewpoints toward open 
trade (e.g. Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), the preliminary finding of 
skepticism toward freer trade of more educated women in low- and middle-income countries is 
enormously important.  While we argue for an economic security-focused explanation, it is 
possible that the hypothesis that the curriculum of the countries’ universities deeply shapes 
people’s opinion toward economic policy is also correct: in developed countries, higher 
education is perhaps more likely to extol the virtues of open trade, at least more than institutions 
of higher education in other countries.  An alternative explanation is that educated women in 
developing societies recognize better some of the fundamental – often economic security-related 
– challenges faced by individuals and specific groups as states liberalize their economies because 
                                                 
13 The logic of a consumption-based approach might suggest that lower and higher income women will have 
differing views on the effects of trade on their consumption power.  Because basic goods comprise a larger 
proportion of income for someone that makes less money, it is reasonable to expect that lower income women will 
have statistically significant positive views of trade’s effects on consumption. Accordingly, in separate 
specifications, I include a multiplicative term of the income and gender variables.  The coefficients of the interactive 
term are negative but not statistically significant in the consumption analyses across the three surveys, a finding that 
is consistent across all of the analyses using other dependent variables, also. 
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these changes are more proximate to them.  It is worth examining this possibility more as 
appropriate data – for example, university curricula in an appropriate broad sample of countries – 
are generated by researchers, an enormous task well beyond the purview of this study. 
This research does examine very preliminarily the closely-related issue of trade 
knowledge using the U.S. survey.  The coefficients of the trade knowledge variable are mixed in 
direction and are never statistically significant across the five analyses.14  When we generate an 
interaction of trade knowledge and gender, it does not produce results that are statistically 
significant.  Women who follow trade closely do not have views statistically different from 
women who do not follow the topic closely.  It is possible that respondents do not really 
understand trade, and the survey question that this research utilizes is an unreliable measure.  
However, it is also possible that an individual’s actual knowledge of trade does not affect their 
views of it in any discernible pattern – in other words, the distribution of those who are negative 
or positive toward trade openness is comparable no matter the level of knowledge, which is 
similar to the issues discussed directly above.  Future surveys need to develop better questions 
that actually test people’s economic and trade knowledge more objectively.      
It is also possible that particularly high levels of education have a different or heightened 
effect on trade attitudes.  Gleason and van Scyoc (1995) have found that even after controlling 
for economics classes, those with graduate and professional degrees are markedly better 
informed about and better prepared to contemplate complex economic issues such as open trade. 
It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that those with a graduate or professional degree are 
more “educated” about the ideas of freer trade (and perhaps have more mobility and/or human 
capital generally), and will therefore be even more supportive of freer trade policies than their 
four-year degree counterparts.  Also, Green et al (2001) argue that in Latin America, workers 
                                                 
14 Removing the knowledge variable from the analysis does not change any other result substantively. 
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with intermediate skills have been particularly hard hit by trade liberalization while those with 
the highest skill levels have done comparatively well. We utilize the Latin America survey to 
examine these arguments and do not find that respondents (men or women) with graduate or 
professional degrees have different views than those with some college or a bachelor’s degree.  
More generally, the results of the education variable (not interacted with gender) in the Latin 
America survey seem to buttress the contention that “knowledge” or “education” could cut either 
way. The coefficients for education are significant at the 5% level in two of the six analyses, but 
notably, the direction of the coefficient changes between the two analyses.  In the growth 
analysis, education is negative and significant suggesting that the most formally educated 
respondents are actually more likely to think that freer trade is not good for overall economic 
growth.  However, in the consumer analysis, the coefficient is positive and significant suggesting 
that the most educated respondents are more likely to report that trade is good for consumer 
issues.  The coefficient for education is also positive in the jobs analysis, though statistically 
significant at the less demanding 10% level. 
IV.f Risk 
 As acknowledged above, we cannot effectively test risk-based hypotheses directly with 
these data, but the general trends suggest that risk might be a situation-specific explanation.  If 
women are more risk-averse naturally then we should observe systematic negative trends in 
women’s attitudes toward trade across these surveys.  These results do not bear out such a 
consistency.  Furthermore, if knowledge attenuates risk, it remains a puzzle why educated 
women in developing countries are more risk-averse than their less-educated counterparts.  
Considering the complexity of the relationship between risk and trade attitudes, a next logical 
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step in terms of testing these potential explanations might include more work out of the 
experimental laboratory.  
 
V. Alternative Explanations  
While the results for many of the control variables vary among the analyses depending on 
the survey and the particular dependent variable, there are some consistent findings of theoretical 
note.  One of the most stable findings using the U.S. and Latin America surveys is the direction 
and significance of the coefficients for prospective economic outlook variable: in nearly every 
analysis, the coefficients of this variable are positive and statistically significant.  This finding is 
consistent with Mansfield and Mutz’s (2009) finding across two national surveys in the U.S.  If a 
respondent is optimistic about the nation’s economic prospects, they are much likelier to support 
trade generally, or to think that it has positive effects on specific facets of the economy (e.g. 
consumption, mobility, macroeconomic, etc.).   
There are, however, potential problematic issues with sociotropic variables that scholars 
sometimes do not acknowledge sufficiently.  Undoubtedly, there is genuine potential for 
tautology because the crude logic suggests that (dis)satisfaction with the economy leads to 
(dis)satisfaction with a major component of the economy – i.e. trade.   On a closely related note, 
it is difficult to know whether sociotropic issues belong on the left- or the right-hand side of the 
empirical equations.  There is a reasonable case for both and scholars have to consider these 
issues carefully. 
In the Muslim-country survey, the coefficients of the Muslim dummy variable are 
negative and statistically significant in seven of the eight analyses (not the consumer dependent 
variable), suggesting that Muslim respondents are much less likely to support trade generally or 
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to think that it has positive impacts on any major aspect such as jobs or the macro-economy.  
There could be myriad explanations for this finding and it deserves considerably more 
investigation in future research, particularly considering the general conclusion of the surveyors 
that Muslims are generally supportive of globalization, which was based on aggregated 
responses not on multivariate analysis with appropriate controls (World Public Opinion 2008). 
Age demonstrates an unanticipated divergence between the U.S. and the two developing 
country surveys in terms of the direction and consistency of the statistical significances of the 
coefficients. As with many other empirical studies, the findings for age in the U.S. survey 
suggest a negative relationship: older people are less likely to be supportive of free trade or to 
believe that it has widespread positive effects.  In all analyses for the U.S., the coefficients for 
age are negative, and in four of the five analyses, they are statistically significant.  Age is 
statistically significant in only two of the six Latin American analyses, but in contrast to the U.S. 
analyses, in both the demand for goods and jobs analyses, the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant.  Apparently, older people in Latin America are more likely to believe 
that trade is good for the demand for a country’s goods and for the availability of jobs.  
Similarly, in the Muslim-country survey, age is positive in all analyses, though only significant 
with the job security and environment dependent variables.  It is possible that in many 
developing countries, older people recall the long-term economic challenges associated with 
closed economies, though new survey data would be necessary to address this issue effectively. 
As discussed above, across the analyses, income is fairly consistently positive and 
significant at the 5% level in nearly half the analyses.  Respondents with higher incomes are 
more likely to deem trade as good generally, or positive for specific aspects of their lives or for 
their country. 
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Ideology and political party are not strong predictors of attitudes toward trade policies.  
In the U.S. results, the coefficients of the political party variables are never statistically 
significant and are inconsistent in terms of direction.  Similarly, with the Latin America survey, 
the signs flip in the two analyses where the coefficients of the ideology measure are significant: 
the coefficient in the general trade analysis is negative while it is positive in the analysis utilizing 
the jobs dependent variable.  Perhaps oddly, respondents who self-identify as left-leaning are less 
likely to be positive toward policies of freer trade, while being more likely to believe that freer 
trade is good for jobs. But this inconsistency may be partly explained by wide changes in the 
workforces in many emerging economies, while also fitting into the theoretical model employed 
in this research.  In many developing countries experiencing more robust growth, the labor 
market is no longer obviously bifurcated between low- and high-skilled workers. In fact, many 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, have an increasingly higher skilled workforce.  These 
changes certainly make the application of a simple mobile-factors model more problematic.  
More importantly to the theoretical inquiry of this research, these changes in workforce 
composition also appear to be generating more uncertainty – at least temporarily – for particular 
groups, including educated women. 
In the Latin America results, the coefficients for the business dummy are positive and 
significant only in the analyses using the general free trade and consumer dependent variables. 
Those who self-identify as working in business are more likely to be positive toward free trade 
and to believe that freer trade is good for consumption-based issues.  Though scholars suggest an 
iron-clad link, support for free trade from those in the business sector is not universal across all 
aspects/effects of trade.  Again, an explanation for the inconsistency may lie in the economic 
changes in many of these countries.  “Business” is far from a monolithic group: the re-structuring 
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of many sectors as a result of more open trade creates both winners and losers, and the tension 
between these groups in regard to attitudes toward trade may be reflected in the lack of statistical 
significance. 
  
VI. Conclusions 
 By using an original analytical approach that focuses not just on general attitudes toward 
free or international trade, but for the first time on a significant scale, on attitudes toward the 
issues and components of free/international trade and its effects, this research generates some 
valuable theoretical insight into and empirical illustrations of how gender may be affecting 
preferences toward trade policies.  The evidence suggests that a mobile factors/economic 
security approach helps us to understand better how gender is affecting trade policy attitudes.   
Women who perceive that they are more economically secure or perhaps observe better 
economic prospects – at least in the face of trade policy change – tend to be more sanguine about 
trade liberalization, including college-educated women in the U.S., and to some extent, less 
educated women in developing countries.  In contrast, women who find themselves in more 
vulnerable economic positions – less educated women in the U.S. and better educated women in 
developing countries – are more skeptical about policies of freer trade.  Considering that the 
preponderance of research on trade attitudes includes only developed countries and finds a 
consistently negative gender effect, this very robust finding for the U.S. is enormously important.  
Moreover, these findings are robust to trade’s broader economic effects – similar patterns clearly 
emerge across multiple facets of trade.  While scholars must do more work to test these 
relationships, empirical evidence supporting broader mobile factors of trade attitudes 
explanations may be partly driven by gender. 
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The findings that educated women in developing nations are not generally positive about 
trade clearly challenges the central notion of the human capital argument – more education does 
not necessarily automatically translate into support for economic liberalization.  Scholars need to 
dissect the possible components of education better.  In particular, in most research, the mobility, 
human capital, knowledge and ideas components of education are not sufficiently distinct.  For 
mobility and human capital, it would be helpful to have a better idea of just how mobile an 
individual is beyond their general level of education.  To examine better the knowledge and ideas 
arguments, scholars need to probe the individual’s technical background and preconceptions 
about principles of trade more objectively, not only by testing their economic and trade 
knowledge, but also by determining better what is being taught in universities or other 
educational venues concerning trade, and how the media are presenting these issues in each 
country.   
The theoretical implications of these findings demand further testing of the economic 
security-focused propositions in new and different contexts.  This research generates compelling 
results from analyses using public opinion data from the U.S., six large Latin American 
countries, and five important predominantly Muslim countries in Asia and Africa that offer some 
insight into why women have different trade policy preferences than men, but the more we can 
test these propositions across time and space, the more likely that we will be able to identify 
these relationships more unambiguously.  Hopefully, too, more pollsters will ask about attitudes 
toward trade’s effects on multiple relevant aspects and not the blunt, much less useful, 
instrument that has been ubiquitous in previous surveys.  Similarly, surveys executed with 
similar methodologies across multiple, varied countries over time would greatly enhance our 
abilities to infer from these type of data.   
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 With trade policy continuing to be high on both national and international agendas, it 
behooves researchers and policymakers to learn more about how attitudes and preferences 
develop.  A recent major event in Latin America demonstrates the importance of developing a 
better understanding of individual-level trade attitudes.  The 2007 referendum in Costa Rica on 
the ratification of a free trade agreement among the Central American countries, the U.S. and the 
Dominican Republic only narrowly passed and public opinion polls suggest that men were 
slightly more likely to support the pact than women.15  With such a close vote, for either the 
“yes” or the “no” side, the preferences of major discrete groups – such as women – were surely 
very important. Across time and space, there continues to be strong evidence of a gender 
component to differences in these individual-level trade policy preferences and this research 
takes important steps toward parsing out some of the explanations of this phenomenon.  
 
                                                 
15 Surveys from both the Universidad de Costa Rica’s (UCR) Escuela de Estadistica and Centro de Estudios de 
Opinion immediately after the referendum and Latin American Public Opinion Project in early 2008 suggest this 
result. 
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Table 1 – Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade and Its Effects in the United 
States, 2008: Ordered Probit 
 General Consumer Workers Business Personal 
      
Female -0.27* -0.37** -0.40** -0.37** -0.22 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
College graduate 0.18 0.19 -0.02 0.10 0.32* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
Female*College 0.17 0.38* 0.45* 0.30 0.00 
Graduate (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.17) 
 
Income 0.07* 0.10** -0.01 0.04 0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Age -0.05* -0.07** -0.07** -0.01 -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Party 0.0002 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.004 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Pocketbook 0.11 0.19* 0.20* 0.17* 0.30** 
Economic (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Prospective 0.47** 0.22* 0.35** 0.21* 0.30** 
Sociotropic Outlook (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
Trade Knowledge 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
Constant 0.23 -0.30 0.04 0.36 -0.02 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) 
 
Observations 775 789 793 786 767 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
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Table 2 – Individual Attitudes Toward Free Trade and Its Components in Six Latin 
American Countries, 2006: Ordered Probit 
  
 Consumption  Economic Security 
 
Free 
Trade 
 
Consumer 
 
Jobs 
Demand for 
Goods Markets Growth 
  
    
   Female 0.001  -0.24*  -0.24* -0.04 -0.23* 0.09 
 
0.12  0.11  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Age 0.0004 
 
0.01 
 
0.01* 0.01* 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.004  0.004  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Education 0.02 
 
0.24** 
 
0.10+ 0.02 0.02 -0.16* 
 
0.06  0.06  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Income 0.06+ 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 0.02 0.07* -0.03 
 
0.04  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Business 
Dummy 0.29* 
 
0.26* 
 
0.14 0.19 0.06 -0.23 
 
0.13  0.12  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Prospective 
Economic  0.24** 
 
0.18** 
 
0.18** 0.20** 0.25** -0.05 
Outlook 0.07  0.06  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Left Party 
Dummy -0.55** 
 
-0.01 
 
0.23* 0.05 0.11 -0.07 
 
0.11  0.11  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Observations 523 
 
523 
 
520 515 515 523 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
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Table 3 – Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade and Its Effects in Five 
Predominantly Muslim Countries, 2007: Probit Analysis 
  Consumption Economic Security Other 
 Trade Consumer Job 
Security 
Job 
Creation 
Standard of 
Living 
 
Domestic 
Business 
Environ
-ment 
Female 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.31** 0.11 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
(0.09) (0.08) 
College  0.59** 0.14 0.22 0.34* 0.26 0.57** 0.25 
Graduate (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
 
(0.16) (0.14) 
Female*  -0.42+ -0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.13 -0.45+ 0.03 
College 
Graduate 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
 
(0.24) (0.22) 
Age 0.004 0.01 0.01* 0.002 0.003 0.04 0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Income 0.12* 0.13* 0.03 0.06 0.13* -0.01 -0.005 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.05) 
Muslim -0.59** -0.18 -0.81** -0.62** -0.52** -0.86** -0.61** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
(0.11) (0.10) 
Constant 0.46** 0.93** 0.02 0.20 0.49** 0.37* -0.07 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
 
(0.17) (0.16) 
N of Obs 3,341 3,186 3,107 3,266 3,099 3,269 3,152 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
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Appendix A – Survey Questions 
 
U.S. Survey 
 
The general question reads: 
 
1) As you may know, international trade has increased a great deal in recent years. Do you 
think that the growth in international trade has made things better or made things worse 
for the United States as a whole?   
 
The trade effects questions use the same root as the general question, but replace the underlined 
with the following: 
 
2) …for you personally? 
3) … for American workers?  
4) …for American business? 
5) …for consumers in the U.S.?  
 
 
Latin America Survey 
 
1) In general, do you think that free trade is very good, good, bad or very bad for the 
economy of your country?”   
2) Rate the effect of trade on the availability of jobs.  
3) Rate the effect of trade on economic growth. 
4) Rate the effect of trade on the demand for your country’s goods. 
5) Rate the effect of trade on the markets for the exports of your country’s goods. 
 
Consumer questions: 
6) Rate the effect of trade on prices for goods and services. 
7) Rate the effect of trade on quality of goods and services. 
8) Rate the effect of trade on the variety of goods and services that are available. 
 
Muslim-Country Survey 
 
1) Do you think international trade is good or bad for creating jobs in [country]? 
2) Do you think international trade is good or bad for job security for [country] workers?   
3) Do you think international trade is good or bad for [country] economy?  
4) Do you think international trade is good or bad for[country] companies?   
5) Do you think international trade is good or bad for your own standard of living?  
6) Do you think international trade is good or bad for consumers like you?   
7) Do you think international trade is good or bad for the environment? 
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Appendix B – Disaggregated Consumer Effects for Latin America 
 
Table 4 - Individual Attitudes Toward Free Trade and Components of Consumption in Six 
Latin American Countries, 2006 
 
Prices Quality Variety 
    Gender Dummy -0.27* -0.28* -0.04 
 
0.12 0.12 0.12 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.01 
 
0.004 0.01 0.01 
Education 0.28** 0.20** 0.17* 
 
0.07 0.07 0.07 
Income 0.004 0.07+ 0.03 
 
0.04 0.04 0.04 
Business Dummy 0.29* 0.09 0.31* 
 
0.13 0.13 0.13 
Manufacturing Dummy -0.13 -0.04 -0.22 
 
0.27 0.27 0.27 
Prospective Economic  0.17** 0.14* 0.15* 
Outlook 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Left Party Dummy 0.11 -0.15 -0.08 
 
0.12 0.12 0.12 
Sovereignty for 0.39** 0.27* 0.28* 
Investment 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Observations 523 523 523 
 
 
